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	<title>Comments for Good Math, Bad Math</title>
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	<link>http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath</link>
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	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 21:08:33 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>Comment on New Dimensions of Crackpottery by Ben</title>
		<link>http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/2013/02/26/new-dimensions-of-crackpottery/#comment-32546</link>
		<dc:creator>Ben</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 21:08:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/?p=2131#comment-32546</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Here&#039;s a funny one from Conservapedia about e=mc^2:

http://www.conservapedia.com/E%3Dmc%C2%B2]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here's a funny one from Conservapedia about e=mc^2:</p>
<p><a href="http://www.conservapedia.com/E%3Dmc%C2%B2" rel="nofollow">http://www.conservapedia.com/E%3Dmc%C2%B2</a></p>
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		<title>Comment on Fuzzy Logic vs Probability by Shawn</title>
		<link>http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/2011/02/02/fuzzy-logic-vs-probability/#comment-32543</link>
		<dc:creator>Shawn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 13:26:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/?p=1300#comment-32543</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In my opinion (and many others) Fuzzy Logic is nothing than a way of thinking of degree of truth of statements. Let&#039;s take the example in this post: &quot;degree of tallness&quot;. To represent the degree of tallness of two persons, A and B, with 2.5 meters and 2.0 meters respectively, one may simply use the ratio of heights: S1 = &quot;A is tall&quot;, S2 = &quot;B is tall&quot;, S3 = &quot;the degree of truth of S1 is 1.25 times higher than the degree of truth of S2&quot;.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In my opinion (and many others) Fuzzy Logic is nothing than a way of thinking of degree of truth of statements. Let's take the example in this post: "degree of tallness". To represent the degree of tallness of two persons, A and B, with 2.5 meters and 2.0 meters respectively, one may simply use the ratio of heights: S1 = "A is tall", S2 = "B is tall", S3 = "the degree of truth of S1 is 1.25 times higher than the degree of truth of S2".</p>
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		<title>Comment on Probability and Interpretations by eric</title>
		<link>http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/2013/05/12/probability-and-interpretations/#comment-32542</link>
		<dc:creator>eric</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 17:40:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/?p=2180#comment-32542</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The coin-flip example is interesting because consideration of &lt;i&gt;unfair&lt;/i&gt; coins shows how the two interpretations can intermix. A frequentist needs some bayesian concepts to deal with them (i.e., unfair coins make clear that we are starting with &lt;i&gt;ideas about&lt;/i&gt; a coin&#039;s properties, which we update - we are not starting by accessing a coin&#039;s properties directly).  Meanwhile, the bayesian is going to have a difficult time making sense of the difference if they don&#039;t acknowledge that there are such things as fair and unfair coins.

IMO this is a case where we have two models, both useful in a wide variety of overlapping cases, but each of which deals with some questions more quickly and more intuitively than the other.   Sure, we could use one of them to solve all (relevant) math problems, but if flipping between them solves problems quicker and easier, why not do that?  I CAN use a claw hammer to screw in a screw, or a screwdriver to drive in a nail...but why would I want to?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The coin-flip example is interesting because consideration of <i>unfair</i> coins shows how the two interpretations can intermix. A frequentist needs some bayesian concepts to deal with them (i.e., unfair coins make clear that we are starting with <i>ideas about</i> a coin's properties, which we update - we are not starting by accessing a coin's properties directly).  Meanwhile, the bayesian is going to have a difficult time making sense of the difference if they don't acknowledge that there are such things as fair and unfair coins.</p>
<p>IMO this is a case where we have two models, both useful in a wide variety of overlapping cases, but each of which deals with some questions more quickly and more intuitively than the other.   Sure, we could use one of them to solve all (relevant) math problems, but if flipping between them solves problems quicker and easier, why not do that?  I CAN use a claw hammer to screw in a screw, or a screwdriver to drive in a nail...but why would I want to?</p>
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		<title>Comment on Probability and Interpretations by Bard Bloom</title>
		<link>http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/2013/05/12/probability-and-interpretations/#comment-32541</link>
		<dc:creator>Bard Bloom</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2013 14:09:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/?p=2180#comment-32541</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The bitterest fights are between Orthodox vs. Conservative Bayesians.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The bitterest fights are between Orthodox vs. Conservative Bayesians.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Probability and Interpretations by Jonas</title>
		<link>http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/2013/05/12/probability-and-interpretations/#comment-32540</link>
		<dc:creator>Jonas</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 19:24:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/?p=2180#comment-32540</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[What about the propensity interpretation of probabilities? This is a theory Karl Popper vouched for (among others) and tries to explain the origin of observable frequencies. I guess it&#039;s more metaphysics than statistics and mathematics.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What about the propensity interpretation of probabilities? This is a theory Karl Popper vouched for (among others) and tries to explain the origin of observable frequencies. I guess it's more metaphysics than statistics and mathematics.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Probability and Interpretations by John Miller</title>
		<link>http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/2013/05/12/probability-and-interpretations/#comment-32539</link>
		<dc:creator>John Miller</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 05:24:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/?p=2180#comment-32539</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[http://xkcd.com/1132/ because it need to be done.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://xkcd.com/1132/" rel="nofollow">http://xkcd.com/1132/</a> because it need to be done.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Probability and Interpretations by Brandon Wilson</title>
		<link>http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/2013/05/12/probability-and-interpretations/#comment-32538</link>
		<dc:creator>Brandon Wilson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 02:50:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/?p=2180#comment-32538</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[E. T. Jaynes&#039; book Probability Theory is a must read for anyone interested in really digging into probability theory.

It derives probability theory from essentially three intuitive properties we&#039;d like probabilities to have.

As a bonus, it shows precisely under what conditions typical frequentist/Bayesian assumptions hold, sort of laying to rest any need for philosophical debates about which is better.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>E. T. Jaynes' book Probability Theory is a must read for anyone interested in really digging into probability theory.</p>
<p>It derives probability theory from essentially three intuitive properties we'd like probabilities to have.</p>
<p>As a bonus, it shows precisely under what conditions typical frequentist/Bayesian assumptions hold, sort of laying to rest any need for philosophical debates about which is better.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Probability and Interpretations by John Armstrong</title>
		<link>http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/2013/05/12/probability-and-interpretations/#comment-32537</link>
		<dc:creator>John Armstrong</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 02:23:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/?p=2180#comment-32537</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Don&#039;t worry, Robert. Troll comment is trolly.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Don't worry, Robert. Troll comment is trolly.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Probability and Interpretations by lily</title>
		<link>http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/2013/05/12/probability-and-interpretations/#comment-32536</link>
		<dc:creator>lily</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:20:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/?p=2180#comment-32536</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This is cool. I did not know that people were so passionate about their interpretations of probability. 

Infinite probability distributions are really confusing. I never understand whether the probability of the outcome depends on the number of points corresponding to an outcome or to some measure of that set. shrug.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is cool. I did not know that people were so passionate about their interpretations of probability. </p>
<p>Infinite probability distributions are really confusing. I never understand whether the probability of the outcome depends on the number of points corresponding to an outcome or to some measure of that set. shrug.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Probability and Interpretations by Robert</title>
		<link>http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/2013/05/12/probability-and-interpretations/#comment-32535</link>
		<dc:creator>Robert</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2013 00:16:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://scientopia.org/blogs/goodmath/?p=2180#comment-32535</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[What do you mean when you say probabilites are algebraically closed? Under what operation? And what do you mean they satisfy a 2 norm instead of a 1 norm? Are you suggesting that a pdf&#039;s L2 norm is 1? If so, this is wrong. Indeed, part of the definition of a pdf is that is 1 in L1 norm. (Of course, when you are dealing with discrete probabilities, the integral is a sum, but if you know measure theory, you will know this is also an integral.)]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What do you mean when you say probabilites are algebraically closed? Under what operation? And what do you mean they satisfy a 2 norm instead of a 1 norm? Are you suggesting that a pdf's L2 norm is 1? If so, this is wrong. Indeed, part of the definition of a pdf is that is 1 in L1 norm. (Of course, when you are dealing with discrete probabilities, the integral is a sum, but if you know measure theory, you will know this is also an integral.)</p>
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